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Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral 
Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of 
originalism from the perspective of Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or 
“philosophic approach” to interpreting, the Constitution. I propose a 
somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. 
Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need 
to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and 
communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a 
theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings 
and moral readings of the Constitution are compatible (spoiler alert: it’s an 
empirical question), and situate empirical reading within the development of 
originalist theory. 
 
Jim Fleming’s characteristically intriguing new book, Fidelity to Our 
Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms,1 
purports to set up an opposition between originalism(s) and what Fleming calls 
a “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to interpreting, the 
Constitution.2 By a “moral reading” or “philosophic approach,” he means 
reference to “conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and 
political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and 
of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about 
how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover 
 
* With apologies to Sandy Levinson. 
† Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
1 JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS 
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015). 
2 Id. at 3. 
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relatively specific original meanings.”3 He offers this view as an alternative 
most directly to “[c]onventional, strong”4 originalism, which he takes to 
prescribe that “[t]he only legitimate source of constitutional interpretation is 
the relatively specific original meanings and original expected applications of 
the founders.”5 The bane of his existence is what he calls “the originalist 
premise,” which is 
the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best—or 
indeed the only—conception of constitutional interpretation. Why so? 
Because originalism, rightly conceived, just has to be. By definition. In 
the nature of things—in the nature of the Constitution, in the nature of 
law, in the nature of interpretation, in the nature of fidelity in 
constitutional interpretation. Axiomatically.6 
He styles the book “a sustained critique of originalism—whether old or new, 
concrete or abstract, living or dead.”7 
Fleming is right that the term “originalism” now describes so many different 
approaches that the label may obscure more than it conveys.8 I certainly do not 
want to be in the position of denying the label “originalist” to anyone who 
wants to claim it, but when I am supposedly standing shoulder to shoulder as 
an “originalist” with, inter alia, Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Sam Alito, 
Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Will Baude, Raoul Berger, and 
Robert Bork—and those are just the “As” and “Bs” that leap immediately to 
mind who are swept in by some currently circulating broad definitions of 
originalism—it is not clear that the label “originalist” is doing a lot of useful 
epistemological work. Accordingly, although I consider myself an originalist 
of sorts, rather than defend originalism here, I instead propose a somewhat 
different opposition in response to Fleming: empirical readings versus moral 
readings. Framing the issue this way reveals some very strange bedfellows and 
points to what I believe is a radically underdeveloped research agenda for 
constitutional interpretation. 
By “empirical reading,” I mean nothing more complex than reading the 
Constitution—or any communicative instrument, such as the Gettysburg 
Address, the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, your spouse’s 
shopping list, or Fleming’s book—for what it says. That is an empirical task 
because communicative meaning in a wide range of contexts is a fact to be 
 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 7. 
7 Id. at xi. 
8 Id. at 2-3 (chronicling the varieties of originalism and cautioning that “if we define 
originalism so inclusively—and we are all now in this big tent—we may obscure our 
differences more than elucidate common ground”). As Fleming recognizes, he is far from 
alone in this observation about originalism’s “balkanization.” See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2009). 
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discovered rather than something to be constructed, invented, or chosen. To 
discover the factual meaning of the United States Constitution, one must 
ascertain the original intentions of the document’s author. That is the right way 
to discover meaning in that context. It just has to be. 
So stated, this position seems to represent precisely the kind of dogmatically 
axiomatic, concrete-intentions-based, authoritarian originalism that Fidelity to 
Our Imperfect Constitution wants to stamp out. Not so fast. There is both more 
and less to empirical reading than meets the eye. 
The subtitle of this Comment is “Could Fleming Be Right This Time?” The 
answer to that question is yes, and even obviously yes. But, as with “[f]orty-
two” as the answer to the ultimate question of life, the universe, and 
everything,9 the trick is to formulate the question properly. What, exactly, is 
the ultimate question of meaning, interpretation, and the Constitution to which 
Fleming has given the right answer? My goals in this brief Comment are to 
explain the relationship between empirical readings and moral readings of the 
Constitution and to identify precisely what, from the standpoint of an empirical 
reader, Fleming has right this time. The short answer—which, out of full 
context, is about as helpful as “forty-two”—is that Fleming is right that 
constitutional interpretation requires a philosophic approach; that the old and 
the new new (though not necessarily the new) originalisms often amount to 
thinly veiled moral readings; and that originalism, even when properly 
conceived as empirical reading, is authoritarian. He is wrong about what kind 
of philosophy one needs for interpretation; wrong that all originalisms, 
including empirical readings, fall prey to his critique; and wrong about the kind 
of authoritarianism that originalism, when cast as empirical reading, 
represents. 
In order to determine what is right and wrong about Fleming’s account, one 
must think deeply and carefully about the nature of interpretation. Since the 
value of scholarship, in my eyes, is measured by how well it prompts deep and 
careful thought, I am profoundly grateful to Fleming, as we all should be, for 
his immensely valuable work. 
I. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (OF PHILOSOPHY) 
Notwithstanding Fleming’s protestations, some form of originalism just has 
to be the right method for ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution. It just 
has to be. This is not an axiomatic assertion. It is a demonstrable truth. 
When faced with a document, one can do any number of things with it. One 
can read it for aesthetic pleasure. One can use it as a coaster for a cup of tea. 
One can treat it as a blueprint for social organization (remember “A Piece of 
the Action” from the original Star Trek series, in which a book on 1920s 
Chicago gangs became the foundation for an entire alien culture).10 One can try 
 
9 DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 135 (1979). 
10 Star Trek: The Original Series: A Piece of the Action (NBC television broadcast Jan. 
12, 1968). 
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to dupe low-information or weak-minded people into treating one’s 
propounded version of it as a blueprint for social organization so that one can 
more readily impose one’s values on them and steal their wealth. Or one can 
try to figure out what it actually says. Of course, in doing any of those other 
activities, one might also try to figure out what it actually says, but one can 
perform any of those other activities without trying to figure out what it 
actually says. And one can try to figure out what it actually says without 
performing any of those other activities. The latter proposition tends to get 
obscured in the context of the United States Constitution because, as a matter 
of practice, interpretation of the document is almost always bound up with 
decisions that implicate the real-world employment of government force. But, 
conceptually, the meaning of the document and the consequences, if any, of 
that meaning are quite different things. To keep those very different ideas 
clear, just imagine that we are interpreting the Constitution of the Confederate 
States of America or an old Soviet constitution, so that ascertainment of 
meaning does not have any current political implications and one’s judgment 
will therefore not be distorted by hopes or wishes about how that meaning will 
affect people’s behavior. 
If one genuinely and honestly tries to figure out what the document actually 
says, then, as a hypothetical imperative, one must be an empirical reader, 
which means in turn that one must be an originalist. One simply has to be. The 
conclusions follow from the nature of the Constitution as a communicative 
instrument and the nature of language as a tool for communication. 
A. Interpretation and Intention 
Most documents are human acts of communication. It is possible, to be sure, 
to imagine a document that has no communicative content, either because it is 
simply random marks or because it is designed to produce emotive rather than 
cognitive content. Most of the time, however, documents are constructed in 
order to convey information—about entities, commands, reactions, or any 
other aspect of the physical, mental, or moral world—from one mind to 
another, even if the respective minds belong to the same person at different 
points in time. Once one identifies a document as an attempt to communicate 
cognitive content, it follows ineluctably that the meaning of the document is 
the content that was intended to be communicated. If you are not trying to 
figure out what the author of a communication intended to communicate, you 
are not engaged in the enterprise of communication. Of course, your efforts to 
figure out communicative content may fail because you do a bad job of 
understanding (either on purpose or through lack of skill or attention), the 
communicator does a bad job of communicating (either on purpose or through 
lack of skill or attention), the subject matter of the communication is difficult 
to convey from mind to mind despite everyone’s best efforts, or any or all of 
the above. To say that interpretation is about communication is not to say that 
interpretation will always yield an answer that can epistemologically be 
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proclaimed correct.11 But if you are not even trying to ascertain the content of a 
communication, you are not participating in an activity that can meaningfully 
be called communication. You may be engaged in some other activity (such as 
imposing values or stealing wealth), and that other activity may be very 
important, and perhaps even more important than the communicative 
enterprise, but it is not communication. I use the word “interpretation” to 
describe the process of ascertaining the meaning of, and therefore the 
intentions behind, a communicative act.12 Thus, interpretation “just is” the 
ascertainment of the original intentions of the communicator. When people like 
Cass Sunstein say that “no approach to interpretation is dictated by the very 
idea of interpretation,”13 they are simply wrong. 
But couldn’t one use the word “interpretation” to describe some cognitive 
activity other than the ascertainment of meaning, such as figuring out the 
morally best account of communicative marks that somehow stays within 
certain conventional linguistic parameters? Of course one could.14 Just like in 
the old joke about baptism, I’ve seen it. Indeed, I have elsewhere identified at 
least eight functions that Jack Balkin believes constitutional “interpretation” 
should try to perform,15 and Jack Balkin is a skilled user of the English 
 
11 The degree to which attempts to understand communication will yield correct answers 
depends on a wide range of considerations, including the standard of proof that governs the 
communicative enterprise and the evidence set that is applied to the task. See generally 
GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (forthcoming 2017). 
12 This is not an idiosyncratic usage of the term “interpretation.” See, e.g., Lawrence B. 
Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2015) (“I 
shall use the word ‘interpretation’ to refer to the activity of discovering the communicative 
content of the constitutional text.”). 
13 Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2874 
(2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism]. For a recent (though equally 
mistaken) elaboration of Professor Sunstein’s position, see Cass R. Sunstein, There Is 
Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193, 193 (2015) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is]. 
14 Similarly, there are any number of ways in which one can use the word “meaning.” 
See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1246-62 (2015); Solum, supra 
note 12, at 1116 (discussing different ways of using the term “meaning”). 
15 Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1227-28 (2012) 
(suggesting that Balkin wants a theory of constitutional interpretation to serve the following 
eight functions: “[T]o (1) ascertain the semantic meaning of constitutional language, (2) 
construct meaning when the ascertainment of semantic meaning is not possible, (3) be 
adequate to our history as a people by explaining and accounting for constitutional 
developments widely regarded as good, (4) explain the process of constitutional change by 
(among other things) accounting for how political and social movements and post-
enactment history shape our constitutional traditions, (5) allow for viable critiques of 
existing practices in the name of a deeper constitutional fidelity, (6) provide a vehicle for 
popular discourse about political and social change, (7) connect the present and past in a 
fashion that promotes identification between ourselves, those who lived in the past, and 
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language. One can use a word to mean anything that one likes as long as the 
usage is clearly defined—so that readers and listeners will be able to ascertain 
the original intentions of, and therefore the communicative content conveyed 
by, the user of the word. One can even use the word “interpretation” to 
describe the process of projecting future events from an examination of goat 
entrails or the process of predicting personality traits from arrangements of 
stars, and as long as the term’s usage is clearly defined, effective 
communication can take place. But in any activity other than discerning the 
original intentions of a communicator, one is not ascertaining meaning. One is 
not discovering the content conveyed by an utterance that exists independently 
of the conscious mind of the specific perceiver. That ascertainment of meaning 
is the aspect of reality that I mean as the referent for the term “interpretation.” 
If other people want to use the word “interpretation” to describe different 
aspects of reality—such as moral readings, Balkin’s eight tasks, or the 
examination of goat entrails—that is certainly their right, and I could hardly 
deny them use of the word for that purpose. I would say only that if one uses 
the word “interpretation” to mean something other than the ascertainment of 
meaning, one must be careful to avoid the fallacy of equivocation by switching 
meanings mid-argument or by trying to cash in on implications or assumptions 
that accompany interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning. By the same 
token, those of us who use the word “interpretation” to signify the 
ascertainment of meaning must similarly avoid switching meanings mid-
stream or appealing to implications that accompany other meanings. Where 
there is a risk that people are using the same word to describe very different 
aspects of reality, clarity demands that people spell out their word usages with 
some care. Of course, if one’s goal is to take advantage of the possibility of 
equivocation in order to help make the weaker argument defeat the stronger, 
hiding your meaning or bait-and-switch may be attractive options. 
I am not interested in who gets custody of the word “interpretation.” I am 
interested in the underlying, objectively existing phenomenon that I am using 
the word to describe: the activity of ascertaining communicative meaning. 
Empirical reading involves the ascertainment of that meaning. And 
ascertainment of that meaning requires ascertainment of the communicative 
intentions behind the utterance whose meaning is being ascertained. 
Thus, this account of interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning involves, 
not an axiomatic assertion of linguistic necessity, but a hypothetical 
imperative: if one wants to understand a communication, then one must 
employ a methodology of original intentions in order to achieve that goal.16 
 
those who will live in the future, and (8) promote the democratic legitimacy of a 
constitutional and legal system that is based on the idea of popular sovereignty, which 
requires attention to sociological, procedural, and moral aspects of legitimacy.”).  
16 Sunstein, perhaps unintentionally, makes the same point. See Sunstein, Second-Order 
Perfectionism, supra note 13, at 2871 (“We ask about the speaker's intentions because, and 
to the extent that, the goal of communication will go badly, or at least less well, if we do 
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Whether one ought, in any particular instance, to want to understand a 
communication is a question of moral theory rather than interpretative or legal 
theory, and I therefore have nothing useful or interesting to say about it in an 
academic forum. 
So, if one is an empirical reader attempting to ascertain meaning, does that 
establish that one, therefore, cannot be a moral reader who looks to 
“conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political 
principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of 
interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how 
they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively 
specific original meanings”?17 No, it does not necessarily establish anything of 
the kind. From the standpoint of interpretative theory, the extent to which an 
empirical reader will also be a moral reader is an empirical question. 
Empirical reading says to look for the intentions of the Constitution’s 
author. It prejudges nothing about the content of those intentions. Perhaps 
those intentions will take the form of relatively specific commands and 
instantiations that require little or nothing by way of moral judgment, but that 
is hardly foreordained. If the Constitution contained a provision that said, 
“Interpret everything in this document to approximate as closely as 
linguistically possible your understanding of the best moral theory at the 
moment of interpretation,” a good empirical reader would have to be a 
Flemingian (Flemingal? Flemish?) moral reader, because the clearly expressed 
empirical intention of that provision is to prescribe a moral reading. The 
Constitution, of course, contains no such clause. But neither does it contain a 
clause that says, “Interpret everything in this document in accordance with the 
concrete and specific expected applications of the author.” In order to 
determine how specifically or abstractly to interpret the Constitution and the 
extent to which it calls for a “moral reading,” either in general or in particular 
instances, one must look at it. 
A good many self-described originalists do not actually look at the 
Constitution in this fashion, at least not carefully enough to ascertain the 
appropriate role, if any, for a moral reading. For example, Justice Scalia 
generally insisted that constitutional provisions be read, to the extent possible, 
in a strictly rule-like fashion.18 But this interpretative move is not derived from 
 
not.”). Professor Sunstein makes this statement in the context of rejecting the idea that 
interpretation just is the ascertainment of communicative intentions. See id. at 2870-72. He 
is right, as I have already noted, that one can attach the word “interpretation” to all sorts of 
activities that have nothing to do with ascertaining communicative intentions. See Sunstein, 
There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, supra note 13, at 198-200. I am talking about 
the activity of ascertaining communicative meaning, not the particular psycho-linguistic 
symbol used to describe it. 
17 FLEMING, supra note 1, at 3. 
18 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 
(1989) (“All I urge is that . . . [discretion-based] modes of analysis be avoided where 
possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the 
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interpretation. It comes instead from a normative theory of law combined with 
a normative vision of the role of judges. If the Constitution, read empirically, 
actually prescribed those normative theories as tools for the ascertainment of 
meaning, Justice Scalia would be right as an interpretative matter. As Steve 
Calabresi and I have tried to show, however, that is not actually a correct 
empirical reading of the Constitution. Some provisions are best read as rules 
while others are best read as standards calling for the exercise of considerable 
degrees of judgment, and there are actually more of the latter than might 
appear at first glance.19 In order to discover how to interpret a particular 
provision, there is no good substitute for reading it. On that point, Fleming is 
absolutely right. 
I think he is not quite as right, however, about either the mechanics or the 
results of that discovery process. To explore the subject, however, requires 
several long detours. And by “long” I mean “book-length.” A full response to 
Fleming requires execution of a research program for originalist interpretation 
that is currently in its infancy. One needs to explore the theory of 
communication to understand the relationship between authors and readers, 
one needs to explore the theory of language to understand how communication 
functions when accomplished through language, and one needs to elaborate a 
theory of concepts to make the theories of communication and language robust 
and accurate. In my short space here, I mean (intend) only to outline the 
vaguest sketch of that research program as a guide to future work. 
B. Interpretation and Concepts 
Once one identifies ascertainment of meaning of a communicative utterance 
as a goal, the right tools for that task must come from a study of the nature of 
communication.20 When that communication is through language, the right 
tools for that task must include the philosophy of language. A sound approach 
to the philosophy of language, in turn, must be grounded in a sound approach 
to the theory of concepts, because language is a tool by which concepts are 
given a perceptual form and thereby made more accessible to the mind. Once 
that epistemological and linguistic foundation is laid, one must then return to 
communication theory to explore the respective roles of authors and 
interpreters in the communicative enterprise. Any account of interpretation that 
 
question allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward the matter, we appellate judges 
bear in mind that when we have finally reached the point where we can do no more than 
consult the totality of the circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders than as 
expositors of the law.”). 
19 Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 483, 502 (2014). 
20 See Corey Rayburn Yung, Constitutional Communication, 96 B.U. L. REV. 303, 309-
11 (2016) (critiquing extant theories of constitutional interpretation for failing to distinguish 
between language and communication as distinct, and asserting that one must focus on the 
nature of communication in constitutional interpretation). 
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does not engage these issues is, to put it unkindly, simply hot gas (or, more 
likely, is using the word “interpretation” to refer to something other than the 
ascertainment of meaning). 
As I have said, to engage any of these issues, much less all of them, is a 
book-length project at the very least. I hope to embark on that project in the 
(given my other commitments) relatively distant future. For present purposes, I 
will have to make do with the following brief, and tentative, observations that 
lay out the research agenda for an account of empirical reading. 
First, the philosophy of language is a hotly contested field.21 That is largely, 
I believe, because it is insufficiently connected to an underlying theory of 
concepts. Because the theory of concepts is also hotly contested, it is 
understandable why someone toiling in the philosophy of language would hope 
to avoid that thicket. I doubt, however, whether such avoidance is possible. 
Second, communication is sometimes divided into semantics and 
pragmatics, with the latter including aspects of communication that go beyond 
sentence meanings that can be derived from standard uses of words.22 If one is 
not looking at pragmatics, however, it is hard for me to see how one can be 
engaged in the enterprise of communication. If communication has a pragmatic 
component, one is not communicating if one ignores that component. It would 
be like tracking three-dimensional motion without one of the vectors. 
Accordingly, I use “communication,” “meaning,” “interpretation,” and all 
related terms to include the pragmatic component of the communicative 
enterprise. 
Third, there is a potentially complex relationship between authorial 
intentions and reader, or public reader, understandings that is directly relevant 
to constitutional interpretation. As Jeff Powell pointed out decades ago, a focus 
on authorial intentions does not necessarily require, at least as an operational 
matter, that one try to discern the subjective intentions of the relevant author.23 
It might very well be that an author’s intention is to put out into the world 
utterances that will then be given meanings by a group of readers (which may 
well require constructing a hypothetical single reader who does not correspond 
to any particular concrete person), in which case the authorial intention reduces 
in practice to a kind of public meaning. But that operational use of public 
meaning is a second-order move, derived from the first-order ascertainment of 
 
21 Consider, for example, the various essays compiled by Andrei Marmor and Scott 
Soames. See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW (Andrei 
Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). As a general introduction to the relevance of 
philosophy of language to legal theory, one could do much worse than to consult ANDREI 
MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW (2014). I mean by this no slight to other philosophers of 
language who regularly address legal issues (Larry Alexander, Mark Greenberg, John Perry, 
Scott Soames, and Larry Solum leap immediately to mind); when I get to the full treatment 
of the subject in a book, they will all get their due. 
22 See MARMOR, supra note 21, at 5-6. 
23 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 938-39 (1985). 
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authorial intention to have a public understanding serve as the effective locus 
of meaning. 
Larry Solum has recently put this point very elegantly: 
[W]hat is sometimes called “public meaning originalism” is actually 
consistent with and a consequence of what is called “original intentions 
originalism”—except in the rare case where the author is crazy or for 
some other reason is radically mistaken about the linguistic beliefs and 
competences of the intended audience. This becomes apparent once we 
see that the relevant intentions are communicative intentions directed to 
the public. The Framers’ meaning of the constitutional text is the meaning 
the Framers intended the public to grasp on the basis of the public’s 
recognition of the Framers’ communicative intentions: That meaning is 
necessarily public meaning. For this reason, the structure of 
communicative intentions (the object of original intentions originalism) 
necessarily focuses on public meaning (the object of public meaning 
originalism) as the means by which communication occurs.24 
Throughout, the theoretical foundation of meaning remains authorial, or 
communicative, intention, but the practical thrust of interpretation will often be 
directed by that theoretical foundation to the understandings of interpreters. 
The extent to which one might expect authorial intention to amount in practice 
to public meaning depends on the kind of document involved. Private diaries, 
for example, are unlikely to embody that kind of meaning-from-public-
understanding intention. Legal documents are more likely to embody such an 
externally directed intention, since legal documents contemplate, and indeed 
require, the active involvement of third parties for their effectiveness. 
Fourth, the “author” of the Constitution whose intentions foundationally 
determine the document’s meaning is not any particular historical Framer or 
group of Framers. It is not even a real person. The author of the Constitution, 
as identified by the Constitution itself, is “We the People,”25 which is a 
hypothetical, legally constructed entity.26 The public audience to which “We 
the People’s” communication is addressed and whose understanding 
constitutes the operational meaning of a communicative instrument such as the 
Constitution is, in turn, also a hypothetical construction, because “the public” 
cannot mean, intend, or understand anything. Only an actual mind, whether 
real or hypothetical, can perform those acts. Just as joint authorship gives rise 
 
24 Solum, supra note 12, at 1136 (footnotes omitted). I would add to Solum’s incisive 
analysis the observation that this account of authorial intentions assumes a good-faith desire 
to communicate information rather than a plan to confuse or deceive. See Andrei Marmor, 
Can the Law Imply More than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 21, at 93-95. 
25 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
26 For more on “We the People” as the Constitution’s legal author, and on the 
metaphysics of joint intentions, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal 
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 59 (2006). 
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to a single hypothetical author, joint readership gives rise to a single 
hypothetical reader, at least in any context in which the evident authorial 
intention is to convey a single meaning.27 
Fifth, and finally, none of the foregoing observations can really provide 
clear insight into meaning until it is joined to a theory of concepts. At this 
juncture, one must be very careful to keep clear the Dworkinian distinction, 
adopted by Fleming, between concepts and conceptions.28 This distinction is 
absolutely crucial to sound interpretation, but not quite in the way that 
Dworkin (or, I believe, Fleming) presents it. 
Concepts are cognitive tools designed to organize a complex reality.29 They 
are integrations of units—aspects of the physical, mental, moral, or relational 
 
27 There are surely contexts in which authors intend for meanings to vary with the reader. 
Legal documents are especially unlikely to fall into this category, unless the whole point of 
the legal document is to sow confusion, though that is a far from implausible account of at 
least some legal documents. 
28 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). 
29 This account of concepts draws heavily on the epistemology of Ayn Rand, described 
most fully in AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (1979), though it 
reflects my own understanding of the phenomenon and not necessarily the precise 
understanding of Rand or anyone else. There is an elaborate body of scholarship developing 
both this theory of concepts and the theory of perception on which the theory of concepts is 
grounded. See, e.g., HARRY BINSWANGER, HOW WE KNOW: EPISTEMOLOGY ON AN 
OBJECTIVIST FOUNDATION (2014); CONCEPTS AND THEIR ROLE IN KNOWLEDGE: REFLECTIONS 
ON OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (Allan Gotthelf & James G. Lennox eds., 2013); DAVID 
KELLEY, THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES: A REALIST THEORY OF PERCEPTION (1986).  
 For another, seemingly different (though, in the end, I think complementary) application 
of this account of concepts to interpretation that, at first glance, appears to support Fleming 
in rejecting all forms of originalism, see TARA SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN OBJECTIVE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 151-62 (2015). Smith sometimes writes as though locating meaning in the 
intentions of communicators denies the objectivity of concepts as referring to real existents. 
See id. at 155. For reasons explained in the text to follow, I think that this misconstrues the 
cognitive and communicative function of concepts. Concepts are cognitive tools; they exist 
only in the minds of communicators. The meaning of a concept, in any given cognitive 
context, consists of real entities with real properties that are not limited to the thoughts of 
specific persons, see Allen Gotthelf, Ayn Rand’s Theory of Concepts: Rethinking 
Abstraction and Essence, in CONCEPTS AND THEIR ROLE IN KNOWLEDGE: REFLECTIONS ON 
OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY, supra, at 8-9, but the class of referents for any concept cannot 
be determined without appealing to a particular cognitive context. See RAND, supra, at 50. I 
believe (based on conversation with her) that Smith actually agrees with all of this, and I 
suspect that, in the end, she will oppose only some, but not all, forms of originalism as tools 
for the ascertainment of meaning. She may well, in all accounts, continue to oppose 
originalism as a theory of adjudication. Whatever her precise views on meaning are, Smith 
is clearly doubtful that legal authority can be grounded in the thoughts of specific 
individuals. See SMITH, supra, at 151 (“Textualism suffers from a constricted understanding 
of abstraction—of the objective meaning of words—and correspondingly (at least by 
implication), it attributes the ultimate authority of law to the beliefs of people. This results 
in a model of proper judicial review that renders the law subjective, rather than objective.”). 
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world—into mental entities that distinguish those units from other units in the 
knower’s cognitive field and then serve as “file folders” to store information 
about those integrated aspects of reality.30 The meanings of concepts are the 
units themselves—the entities or relationships—to which the concepts refer, 
and concepts therefore presumptively include as part of their meaning aspects 
or attributes of those entities or relationships that have yet to be discovered or 
fully grasped.31 One can certainly have a concept that is limited to the 
particular entities or aspects of entities known or contemplated at a specific 
moment in time, and there may well be cognitive contexts in which that is an 
appropriate content for a concept, but that is not the usual, or presumptive, 
cognitive character of concepts. In order to determine whether a concept is 
limited to those specific instantiations—what Dworkin would call 
“conceptions” and what Fleming would call “expected applications”—one 
would have to look very carefully at the concept and the cognitive context in 
which it appears. In other words, it is an empirical question whether a 
particular concept is meant to function in its presumptive cognitive fashion by 
referring to a whole set of actual, known and unknown, entities or attributes of 
entities or to serve a more limited cognitive role by referring only to a specific 
subset of those entities or attributes. Thus, if an author refers to “the freedom 
of speech,” it is possible that the author intends to refer only to some quite 
specific conceptions or instantiations of a potentially wider idea. But because 
that is not the standard cognitive role for concepts, one would expect to see 
some direct indication that the author so intends. Otherwise, the normal 
assumption would be that the author is referring to all past, present, and future 
instances of “the freedom of speech,” including all of their known and 
unknown attributes. 
This account of concepts seems to provide considerable support for the 
interpretative posture favored by Fleming, as it seems to counsel strongly 
against an “original expected applications” approach to interpretation.32 And, 
indeed, it does . . . up to a point. 
The crucial limiting consideration stems from how concepts serve a dual 
function as tools of both cognitive organization and communication. Because 
 
On that I agree with her completely, but that has nothing to do with the actual content of 
communications. The Constitution means what it means regardless of whether or not it has 
any authority. I hope to further explore the extent to which my views and Smith’s views are 
compatible in another work. 
30 See Gotthelf, supra note 29, at 8-9; RAND, supra note 29, at 88 (“Since concepts 
represent a system of cognitive classification, a given concept serves (speaking 
metaphorically) as a file folder in which man’s mind files his knowledge of the existents it 
subsumes. The content of such folders varies from individual to individual, according to the 
degree of his knowledge . . . but it pertains to the same referents, to the same kind of 
existents, and is subsumed under the same concept.”). 
31 See RAND, supra note 29 at 87 (“[A] concept is an ‘open-end’ classification which 
includes the yet-to-be-discovered characteristics of a given group of existents.”). 
32 See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 1, at 22-23, 75-76. 
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concepts group entities and relationships in order to allow minds to navigate a 
complex world, the way in which those groupings are made depends on the 
actions, and the cognitive needs, of a particular mind.33 One person in one 
setting may have, and need, a different way of organizing reality than a person 
in another setting. Of course, because reality is objective, and because human 
minds tend to have certain observable commonalities, there is likely to be 
considerable overlap in how different people, across both space and time, 
construct and apply concepts. But, as a matter of communication, if one is 
trying to understand authorial intentions, and therefore meaning, one needs to 
try to understand the particular way in which the specific author—in a 
particular time, place, and cognitive context—organized the world. The 
criteria that include or exclude entities from a concept are determined by the 
cognitive ordering of the author. Those criteria are what make the concept a 
concept. The concept, once formed, presumptively includes all known and 
unknown referents of the concept and all known and unknown attributes of the 
referents, but the criteria for determining the referents are fixed, for 
communicative purposes, by the cognitive context of the author. That is why 
originalism is, as Sai Prakash has put it, a “Default Rule” for interpretation.34 
Concepts mean their referents, and what determines whether something is a 
referent is the intention of the communicator. Words represent concepts, 
concepts mean referents, and the classes of referents are determined by the 
cognitive ordering scheme of the mind that formed the concepts 
To be sure, as we have already noted, an author who is trying to 
communicate effectively will try to grasp how a reader will understand his or 
her concepts.35 If the author is trying effectively to communicate information 
about some aspect of the world, he will try to use concepts that will effectively 
convey that information to the reader, which means that the reader’s 
conceptual framework may actually, as a second-order matter, be intended to 
determine which features of the world the concept identifies. It is even likely 
that this reader-oriented approach is the default authorial intention in a very 
wide range of circumstances. If the difference between the author’s and the 
reader’s cognitive frameworks is small, this difference in perspective will not 
matter much. But the author may intend that, in the event of a conflict, the 
conceptual framework of a reader should determine the referents of a concept. 
One can even imagine communications where what looks like a concept is 
really just a blank placeholder to be filled in by future readers. It is an 
empirical question in any given case whether that was the author’s intention. 
 
33 See RAND, supra note 29, at 43 (explaining that “[a]ll conceptualization is a contextual 
process” and that “the content of [a person’s] concepts is determined and dictated by the 
cognitive content of his mind”). 
34 Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 
529, 529-30, 541-42 (1998) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)). 
35 See Solum, supra note 12, at 1134. 
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Hence, Dworkin and Fleming are right that interpretation-as-communication 
does not automatically, or even presumptively, entail resort to the particular 
conceptions or expected applications of authors—or, for that matter, of readers. 
Indeed, it presumptively entails precisely the opposite. But one must still 
determine what criteria for referents the author intended in the 
communication. 
For example, in the context of the federal Constitution, what did the 
hypothetical, legally constructed author “We the People”—or, as an 
operational matter, the hypothetical, legally constructed reader targeted by the 
author—mean in 1791 by the term “liberty” in the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause? An empirical reader would not ask for a laundry list of 
specific human activities that exhaust the content of the concept. But an 
empirical reader would ask what criteria the author, and derivatively the public 
reader, had in mind for distinguishing things that fall into that author’s/reader’s 
concept of “liberty” from other things that are better organized—from the 
cognitive standpoint of the author/reader—under other conceptual headings. 
As a first-order matter, that inquiry does not involve moral theorizing and 
therefore does not call for the kind of “philosophic approach” favored by 
Fleming. It is an empirical inquiry. As a second-order matter, that inquiry 
might call for moral theorizing if the best empirical account of authorial 
intention is precisely that the concept of “liberty” in that context is meant to 
refer to those things that actually, under a best understanding, conform to a 
certain normative account of human action. There is nothing in empirical 
interpretation that a priori rules out this kind of second-order “moral reading,” 
just as there is nothing in empirical interpretation that a priori requires it. One 
has to conduct an investigation into the facts to figure out how to establish the 
concept’s referents. 
As it happens, there is good reason to think that the concept of “liberty,” as 
it would have been used by either an author or a reader of a legal document in 
1791, would have been understood to have a relatively narrow set of referents, 
corresponding to freedom of bodily movement unrestricted by government 
agents.36 It would include all such movements, present and future, and thereby 
implicate all government restrictions on such movements, present and future 
(and therefore include movements and restrictions involving technology 
unimaginable to an eighteenth-century person),37 but an empirical account of 
authorial intention would not call for what Fleming would term a “moral 
reading,” in which modern readers figure out the best normative account of 
“liberty.” On the other hand, it is far less clear that one would necessarily reach 
 
36 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632-33 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (finding that a historic reading makes it “hard to see how the ‘liberty’ protected 
by the [Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause could be interpreted to include anything 
broader than freedom from physical restraint”). 
37 See Gotthelf, supra note 29, at 15 (explaining that an “open-end” concept comprises 
“all relevantly similar instances, past, present, and future”). 
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the same conclusion when examining the term “liberty” as it appears in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 Perhaps, when all is said 
and done, one would conclude that the terms have precisely the same referents, 
but that is an empirical question, on which I have no considered opinion. 
Of course, an author or reader in the twenty-first century who writes or 
reads about “liberty” may well have a very different conceptual framework and 
may thus use the term “liberty” to describe a very different set of real-world 
phenomena. In interpreting a text, which conceptual framework determines its 
meaning? If interpretation means the discovery of communicative meaning, the 
answer is obviously the conceptual framework intended by the communicating 
author. If interpretation means something else, such as figuring out which set 
of referents for the concept of “liberty” will lead to the best consequences, it is 
quite possible that neither the author’s nor the (current) reader’s framework is 
optimal. 
The one-run-on-sentence-while-metaphorically-standing-on-one-foot39 
version of this analysis, for whatever it is worth, is: As a matter of 
communication, authorial intentions determine the criteria for referents for 
concepts, though those intentions, especially with regard to legal documents 
aimed at third persons, often get operationalized in practice as the intentions of 
a hypothetical reader, and that hypothetical reader’s cognitive framework thus 
determines the criteria for inclusion of units (things and relations) within the 
concepts used in the communication, though the concepts themselves 
presumptively include all known and unknown attributes of the units to which 
the concepts refer, so that people like Fleming and Dworkin are right that 
interpretation-as-communication does not automatically, or even 
presumptively, entail resort to the particular conceptions or expected 
applications of either authors or readers, but it does—to return to the 
beginning—entail resort to the criteria for determining the referents of the 
concepts employed by the hypothetical reader, and that is, by its nature, an 
originalist enterprise. 
So, in the end, Fleming is right that constitutional interpretation, and 
interpretation of any communicative act, requires what one might call a 
“philosophic approach.” But I think he has the wrong branch of philosophy in 
mind. The branch of philosophy that is required for sound interpretation is 
epistemology, not moral theory, with a strong dose of philosophy of language 
 
38 Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 
408, 415-17 (2010) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
incorporates “a recognizable form of substantive due process” that the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause lacks). 
39 In the course of delivering a version of this comment as oral remarks, it was 
conclusively demonstrated that my motor-planning difficulties and general all-around 
klutziness do not allow me to stand on one foot long enough to speak this sentence. Not 
even close, actually. 
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lurking in the background. The research agenda for a sound originalism must 
focus on these questions of meaning, language, and communication. 
Of course, for many people, originalism is not, or not only, a theory of 
interpretation, but is also a theory of adjudication.40 It is, for some people, a 
prescription for how real-world actors should decide actual cases with tangible 
consequences.41 To translate interpretative meaning into a theory of 
adjudication does require moral philosophy, as Fleming suggests. Once you 
know what the Constitution means, it is a question of moral and political 
theory, not of interpretative theory, what to do with that meaning. Should that 
meaning guide conduct in any way—more than, for example, the Bible, Atlas 
Shrugged, The Communist Manifesto, the political platform of the liberal wing 
of the Democratic Party, or the menu at IHOP? Interpretative theory has 
nothing to say about that question. Originalism, in the form of empirical 
reading, is not a prescription for anything. It is a means of acquiring facts. 
II. WHAT IS OLD ABOUT THE OLD ORIGINALISM AND NEW ABOUT THE NEW 
ORIGINALISM (AND NEW NEW ABOUT THE NEW NEW ORIGINALISM)? 
Old originalists, such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork (at least before 
199042), did not talk as I do. They did not discuss epistemology, concepts, 
communication, and the philosophy of language. They discussed such things as 
judges, democracy, constraint, and authority. That is because Fleming is right 
about yet another thing: the old originalism was an “ism.”43 It was not actually 
a theory of interpretation or meaning, but was rather a theory of adjudication or 
decision-making. As such, it belongs in the domain of moral or political theory 
rather than interpretative or legal theory. Put more bluntly: the old originalists 
were moral readers. They employed abstract commitments to certain 
conceptions of democracy, judicial role, and the rule of law rather than 
employing abstract commitments to left-liberalism as “interpretative” tools, 
but, as the old joke goes, that is just haggling over the price. 
That is less true of the “new originalism”—though, as I will shortly explain, 
it may more largely be true of the “new new originalism.” The new originalism 
is the product of a generation of theorists, many of whom were students of 
Robert Bork or Antonin Scalia, who began recasting originalism in the mid-
 
40 See generally Gary Lawson, Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309 
(2013) (distinguishing between originalist theories of interpretation and originalist theories 
of adjudication). 
41 See id. at 1313. 
42 Judge Bork’s views shifted somewhat while he was writing The Tempting of America 
because (1) he had the good sense to employ Steve Calabresi as his research assistant, and 
(2) he had the intellectual integrity to listen to his research assistant and to change even 
some long-held positions in response to persuasive argument. He did not make it all the way 
to an empirical reading of the Constitution, but he traveled quite a distance, and that journey 
deserves acknowledgment. 
43 FLEMING, supra note 1, at 3. 
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1980s and early 1990s. Important figures in that movement include (and I 
apologize to everyone that is missing from this list) Randy Barnett, Steve 
Calabresi, John Harrison, John McGinnis, Mike Paulsen, Sai Prakash, Mike 
Rappaport, and myself. The movement is sometimes cast as a shift in focus 
from original authorial intentions to original public meaning, largely because 
of a speech given in 1986 by then-Judge Scalia that highlighted the distinction 
between those two ideas.44 That shift, which takes many forms (including the 
form, defended here, which grounds itself in authorial intentions but 
operationalizes those intentions as public meaning in the specific context of a 
legal document “authored” by a hypothetical “We the People”) is an important 
part of the picture, but it misses the key development. The real move reflected 
in the new originalism was from originalism as a theory of adjudication and 
governance to originalism as a theory of interpretation and meaning. To be 
sure, virtually all of the new originalists (essentially everyone except me) put 
forth originalism both as a theory of interpretation and as a theory of 
governance, but new originalists generally acknowledge that those are distinct 
moves that require distinct lines of reasoning to defend. Thus, I think Fleming 
gets it precisely backwards when he characterizes the new originalism as a 
move from anti-Warren Court tirades to a governing judicial philosophy.45 He 
has taken bad guidance from Keith Whittington, who postulated—with 
absolutely zero evidence that I can see—precisely such a move as the 
explanation for the emergence of the new originalism in the Reagan and post-
Reagan years.46 That is the sort of thing that sounds nice to political scientists 
who like that kind of explanation. It just happens to be, I believe, wildly false, 
and indeed backwards, as an account of the emergence of the new originalism. 
The new originalists, most of whom I personally have known at least casually 
since the 1980s, were engaged in an intellectual rather than a political 
enterprise. That may disappoint political scientists (and it may seem incredible 
to people for whom everything is political and who cannot even imagine 
separating politics from ideas), but that was certainly my understanding of the 
movement as I watched it develop. 
Fleming’s attribution of “ism-ism,” however, may well be right about at 
least some portion of the so-called “new new originalism,”47 which began 
emerging in the late 1990s and has seen considerable flowering in the twenty-
 
44 Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 106 (1987) 
(explaining that he “ought to campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original 
Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”). 
45 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 5. 
46 See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 603-
04 (2004). 
47 Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 707, 709 (2011). 
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first century. Just as originalism describes a family of theories rather than a 
single approach, the new new originalism covers a wide spectrum.48 If there is 
a defining feature of the new new originalism, it is perhaps its focus on the 
distinction between interpretation, or the ascertainment of meaning, and 
construction, or the implementation and supplementation of that meaning in 
the course of adjudication.49 Fleming is, I believe, right that what new new 
originalists call “construction” could just as easily be called “moral reading” 
because it involves filling in space with something other than empirical 
reading.50 Once one goes beyond meaning, just about anything that fills the 
gap will fit Fleming’s definition of a moral reading. All that changes is the set 
of abstract commitments that one uses in place of meaning. 
Even Justice Scalia, who is something of a focal point for all three 
generations of originalism because he made important contributions to each, 
was a moral reader (I did say that comparing moral reading and empirical 
reading would reveal some strange bedfellows). Justice Scalia had a much 
more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of interpretative theory than 
did, for example, Raoul Berger, but Justice Scalia was also in the grip of a 
theory of normative legitimation. He shaded his readings of the Constitution to 
fit a particular conception of (1) normatively binding law and (2) institutional 
judicial role. As he said in print, “I take the need for theoretical legitimacy 
seriously, and even if one assumes . . . that the Constitution was originally 
meant to expound evolving rather than permanent values, . . . I see no basis for 
believing that supervision of the evolution would have been committed to the 
courts.”51 In this general understanding of the relationship between 
interpretation and normative theory, he is firmly aligned with Jack Balkin, who 
speaks for virtually everyone (except me) in the American legal community 
when he writes that “[c]oncerns about legitimacy underwrite theories of 
constitutional interpretation . . . [and] we argue for or against different theories 
of constitutional interpretation in terms of their effects on legitimacy.”52 
Are Justice Scalia and Jack Balkin—and, for good measure, Fleming—
wrong to think this way? Not necessarily; it depends entirely on what they are 
trying to do. If one is trying to prescribe normative guidance and establish 
legitimacy, normative theory is the right place to look (though I suspect that 
none of Justice Scalia, Balkin, or Fleming would very much like the answers 
that an objectively sound normative theory would actually provide). But if one 
is trying to ascertain meaning, then not so much. The Constitution means what 
it means, whether or not that meaning makes it normatively attractive or 
 
48 For a good introduction, see the various essays in Symposium, The New Originalism 
in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (2013). 
49 See Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or Classical Liberal Construction?, 
8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 814-16 (2014). 
50 See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
51 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989). 
52 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 64 (2011). 
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unattractive and legitimate or illegitimate, and whether or not a proper 
conception of the judicial role requires, allows, or forbids judicial application 
of it. Meaning is an empirical fact. 
Empirical reading is not an “ism.” It is simply the application of basic 
principles of epistemology to one particular search for knowledge. Empirical 
readers qua empirical readers have no interest in democracy, constraint, or 
authority (though they might have interest in such subjects in capacities other 
than as empirical readers). They are looking for the communicative content of 
human utterances and, in particular, of utterances that were made at specific 
points in space and time by joint authors who cast their works as the products 
of a hypothetical, legally constructed entity called “We the People.” A good 
empirical reader might well be a full-fledged anarchist who sees no plausible 
argument for political authority, constitutional or otherwise, considers a search 
for legitimacy a fool’s errand, and regards democracy as a large-scale mugging 
that takes place in polling booths rather than alleys.53 Such a person, again qua 
empirical reader, has as little in common with old-style originalism as he does 
with Fleming’s moral reading. 
I doubt whether Fleming’s project is aptly characterized as developing a 
moral reading of the Constitution. Fleming is really proposing a moral 
application of the Constitution (from the perspective of a fundamentally 
flawed moral theory, but that is a story for another day and another life). 
Reading the Constitution and applying the Constitution are two distinct 
enterprises that require very different tools and skills. 
To illustrate how Fleming’s project is about application rather than 
interpretation, consider his account of the “three incorrigible flaws”54 that he 
sees in the old originalism: 
(1) [t]he moral burden of the old originalism with regard to both rights 
and powers—its concrete intentionalism entails that Brown v. Board of 
Education was wrongly decided and that most of the modern federal 
government is unconstitutional; (2) the authoritarianism of the old 
originalism is a massive insult to the dignity of both the founders and 
us—it attributes arrogance to the authors of the norms of the Constitution 
 
53 See Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: 
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 n.51 (2012) 
(“Indeed, in my nonprofessional life, I am very concerned about political legitimacy—
especially since, as a libertarian anarchist, I do not find much of it anywhere. I certainly do 
not find it in democracy. If two people come upon a third in an alley and vote to take the 
third person’s wallet, there is nothing legitimate about the action (unless, of course, they 
have a valid claim to the wallet based on something other than their vote, such as prior theft 
of the wallet by the third person). If one multiplies the numbers on each side by 100,000,000 
and changes the alley to a series of polling booths, all one has changed is the number of 
victims and the number of perpetrators. Democracy is a fine way for a group to decide 
where to have dinner or who will chair the next faculty meeting. It is not a fine way to 
decide who gets to spend my money or which substances I can ingest.”). 
54 FLEMING, supra note 1, at 4. 
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and subservience to the subjects of those norms (to add further insult, its 
proponents serve it up to us in the name of democracy); and (3) its 
concrete intentionalism is untenable as a theory of interpretation of our 
Constitution, which establishes a charter of abstract aspirational 
principles and ends and an outline of general powers, not a code of 
detailed rules.55 
Rather obviously, the first two criticisms, entirely apart from whether they 
are accurate,56 are solely concerned with normative political theory and have 
nothing to do with interpretation as such. They do not even present themselves 
as flaws in reading the Constitution, in the sense of discerning the 
communicative signals contained therein. These criticisms address only the 
consequences of treating an originalist reading as a guide to action in the real 
world. This says nothing, even in principle, about whether the reading is 
correct as a reading. The third criticism at least takes the form of an argument 
about interpretation and meaning, but it too is driven, I believe, by normative 
concerns about legitimacy, goodness, and such. It is very difficult to read the 
Constitution—literally to sit down and read the Constitution from start to 
finish—and conclude that it is a charter of abstract commitments rather than a 
set of detailed rules. It is full of detailed rules. There are seemingly endless, 
tedious, soporific paragraphs laying out detailed rules. Then, on some 
occasions, there are a few provisions that seem to stretch more broadly and 
could plausibly be seen as aspirational in character. It is semantically possible 
to jump on those few provisions and transform them into the centerpiece of 
interpretation. It is not pragmatically possible to do that by reading the 
Constitution for what it is. One has to be reading the Constitution through a 
normative lens to get there. 
And, indeed, Fleming casts his entire lifelong project as an exercise in 
perfecting the Constitution. As he eloquently puts it: “A moral reading, 
because it understands that the quest for fidelity in interpreting our imperfect 
Constitution exhorts us to interpret it so as to make it the best it can be, offers 
 
55 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
56 Most of the modern federal government is obviously unconstitutional under any 
plausible originalist account, be it old or new. Whether that is a moral burden or a moral 
virtue depends on what foundationally sound moral theory prescribes about the modern 
federal government. Whether Brown was rightly or wrongly decided, at least from the 
standpoint of empirical reading, depends on whether public education is a “privilege or 
immunity” and, if so, whether separate-but-equal facilities “abridge” that privilege or 
immunity; I have never researched those questions, but really smart people who have done 
so seem to think that the answer to both questions is yes, and that is the sort of thing about 
which they are likely to be right. See Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism 
and Brown v. Board of Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 434-35. Old originalists will 
have to answer the relevant questions for themselves. As to whether authoritarianism of the 
sort described by Fleming is a bad idea: it depends on whether the authorities are more 
likely to get right answers than modern folk. Looking around at the world, I am inclined to 
think that the old folks were, if not smarter, then at least wiser than modern public figures. 
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hope that the Constitution may deserve our fidelity, or at least may be able to 
earn it.”57 An empirical reader, or indeed any kind of reader rather than applier, 
would not try to make the Constitution the best that it can be, or even 
moderately tolerable, when performing the exercise of discerning 
communicative signals. He or she would read the Constitution for what it is.58 
Once that communicative content is known, one can then make judgments 
about its merit, and therefore can make judgments about the extent to which 
one is prepared to take it as real-world guidance. Such judgments must, from 
the standpoint of ascertainment of meaning, follow rather than precede the act 
of interpretation. Otherwise, it is not actually a reading of the Constitution; it is 
a construction of the Constitution.59 Perhaps the real subtitle of this book 
should be For Moral Constructions and Against Originalisms. Because a good 
percentage of originalist theorizing these days is actually construction rather 
than interpretation, which means normative prescription rather than reading, 
that would be a fine and productive opposition. 
The not-very-startling upshot, which is neither threatening nor even 
especially troubling to Fleming’s project, is that Fleming is not much 
interested in the ascertainment of meaning. He is interested in providing 
guidance for real-world judgment. He wants to tell judges and other officials 
how to decide cases—which really means telling judges and other officials 
who to shoot, whose lives to control, and whose wealth to seize. That is, of 
course, what pretty much everybody in the world of constitutional 
interpretation except me is trying to do, and the conflicts among the contending 
theorists reduce to who gets shot, whose lives get controlled, and whose wealth 
gets seized. The actual empirical meaning of the Constitution sometimes plays 
a role in that process, but mostly not. And that is true across the board. To the 
extent that Fleming is concerned with describing constitutional practice rather 
than ascertaining constitutional meaning, it is very hard to argue that he has it 
wrong.60 
 
57 FLEMING, supra note 1, at 20 (footnote omitted). 
58 See SMITH, supra note 25, at 237, 264-65. 
59 Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 479, 483 (2013) (defining construction as “the determination of the legal content and 
legal effect produced by the legal text”). 
60 During the oral exchange on which this Comment is based, Sandy Levinson suggested 
that there are large chunks of the constitutional world in which the actual meaning of the 
text controls actions—and does so with such thoroughness that it is simply taken for 
granted. Rhode Island gets two votes in the Senate, and the President gets to veto legislation, 
and while some people grouse about what a bad idea those things might be, no one doubts 
that they are part of the Constitution’s meaning. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The 
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by 
the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.”); id. art. I, § 7, 
cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he 
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in 
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III. REALITY BITES 
Fleming deeply dislikes interpretative theories that are “authoritarian,” in 
the sense that they prescribe answers for present readers rather than give 
readers a framework for reaching their own answers. Put aside whether it is a 
good or bad thing for a theory to be authoritarian in that sense (surely the 
answer depends, at least to some degree, on whether the authority is more 
likely than the subjects to get the right answers).61 Is empirical reading 
authoritarian? 
It clearly is not authoritarian—nor libertarian—in the sense meant by 
Fleming, because empirical reading prescribes no particular course of action. It 
does not tell anyone what to do with the meaning of the Constitution once they 
have it. It does not instruct decision-makers to follow that constitutional 
meaning rather than their own best judgments about moral theory if the two 
seem in conflict. Originalism as an “ism” is certainly authoritarian; indeed, it 
wears that label proudly as a badge of honor. But empirical reading stays out of 
that arena altogether. 
There is one respect, however, in which empirical reading is authoritarian. 
For empirical readers, meaning is fixed (at least presumptively) by the 
cognitive frameworks of historically situated authors—real or hypothetical—
that determine the criteria for referents for the concepts used in 
communication. Those frameworks are facts. The discernment of meaning is 
an archaeological rather than creative task. But that is authoritarian in the same 
way that, for example, geology is authoritarian. The facts are what they are, 
and the facts dictate the inquiry. 
 
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and 
proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to 
pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it 
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become 
a Law.”). All true. But sometimes not true. The Recess Appointments Clause is about as 
clear as it could be that recess appointments are permissible only when a vacancy occurs 
when the Senate is in recess—meaning its between-sessions recess rather than a break 
within a session. See Robert G. Natelson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies that May 
Happen During the Recess” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 213-27 (2014); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2005). But if that gets too 
inconvenient for the ambitions of the political class (ambitions that regularly cross party 
lines), too bad for the clear meaning of the Constitution—and the Supreme Court can 
usually be counted on to go with the practice rather than with the Constitution. See NLRB v. 
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573 (2014). For an even more dramatic departure from the 
unmistakably clear meaning of a hard-wired structural provision, check out Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 225-29 (1986), and prepare to be 
astounded. Does anyone seriously think that if today’s social justice warriors get control of 
the Supreme Court, they will let something like the text of the Senate Clause stand in the 
way of their agenda? 
61 See supra note 56. 
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From the standpoint of empirical readers, Joe Friday would have been a 
great interpreter. 
 
